Traditionally, wireless network protocols have been designed for performance. Subsequently, as attacks have been identified, patches have been developed. This has resulted in an "arms race" development process of discovering vulnerabilities and then patching them. The fundamental difficulty with this approach is that other vulnerabilities may still exist. No provable security or performance guarantees can ever be provided. We develop a system-theoretic approach to security that provides a complete protocol suite with provable guarantees, as well as proof of min-max optimality with respect to any given utility function of source-destination rates. Our approach is based on a model capturing the essential features of an ad-hoc wireless network that has been infiltrated with hostile nodes. We consider any collection of nodes, some good and some bad, possessing specified capabilities vis-a-vis cryptography, wireless communication, and clocks. The good nodes do not know the bad nodes. The bad nodes can collaborate perfectly, and are capable of any disruptive acts ranging from simply jamming to noncooperation with the protocols in any manner they please. The protocol suite caters to the complete life cycle, all the way from the birth of nodes, through all phases of ad-hoc network formation, leading to an optimized network carrying data reliably. It provably achieves the min-max of the utility function, where the max is over all protocol suites published and followed by the good nodes, while the min is over all Byzantine behaviors of the bad nodes. Under the protocol suite, the bad nodes do not benefit from any actions other than jamming or cooperating. This approach supersedes much of the previous work that deals with several types of attacks including wormhole, rushing, partial deafness, routing loops, routing black holes, routing gray holes, and network partition attacks.
Several candidates have been proposed. Medium-access control protocols include IEEE 802.11 [11] and Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance for Wireless (MACAW) [2] ; power control protocols include COMPOW [13] and PCMA [16] ; routing protocols include DSDV [19] , AODV [18] , DSR [12] , and OLSR [5] ; and transport protocols include TCP [22] and variations for ad-hoc networks [3] , [7] , [14] , and [23] .
All of the aforementioned protocols are designed on the assumption that all nodes are "good," and will conform to the protocol. Some nodes can, however, be malicious, deliberately intent on disrupting the network, a vulnerability especially acute since the very purpose of ad-hoc networks is to allow any node to join a network. For wireless networks used in safety-critical applications, for example, vehicular networks, vulnerabilities can be dangerous. Moreover, many wireless networking protocols have been based on wireline protocols, with possible susceptibilities to novel over-the-air attacks.
The assumption of benignness, implicit or explicit, has been the traditional starting point of protocol development. Systems have been first designed to provide high performance. Subsequently, as vulnerabilities have been discovered, they have been patched on a case-by-case basis. For example, the "wormhole" attack was discovered in [8] , where an attacker sets up a false link between two nodes. It is countered by a fix using temporal and geographical packet leashes [8] , [21] . The "rushing" attack against DSR was discovered in [9] , where attackers manipulate the network topology. This is countered by a fix using network discovery chains. The "partial deafness" attack against 802.11 was discovered in [4] , where an attacker artificially reduces its link quality to draw more network resources. It is countered by a fix using queue regulation at the access point. Other attacks against DSR are the routing loop attack where an attacker generates forged routing packets causing data packets to cycle endlessly, the routing black hole attack where an attacker simply drops all packets it receives, and the network partition attack where an attacker injects forged routing packets to prevent one set of nodes from reaching another. These attacks are all countered in the Ariadne protocol [10] by the joint use of routing chains, encryption, and packet leashes. Some protocols, such as Watchdog and Pathrater [15] , try to pre-empt attacks by maintaining a blacklist that tracks malicious behavior, but this backfires if an attacker maligns a good node, causing other good nodes to add that node to their blacklists. These attacks do not target violating privacy of communications between nodes, which can be avoided simply by encryption. Rather, they are generally denial-of-service attacks (DoS), which usually take advantage of algorithms that assume the participating users are good or cooperative.
The basic problem with this arms race approach of hardening algorithms initially designed for good performance is that one 2325 never knows what other vulnerabilities or attacks exist. Thus, no guarantees can be provided about the security of the protocols at any stage of the arms race process. Our goal is to propose an alternate clean slate systemtheoretic approach to security that provides provable performance guarantees. We pursue a model-based approach, comprising a physical model of node capabilities, clocks, cryptography, and wireless communication. It is an initial attempt to holistically model the entire dynamics of an ad-hoc wireless network that has been infiltrated with hostile nodes.
Our goal is to design a protocol suite for the complete lifecycle of the wireless system, all the way from the very birth of the nodes, and continuing through all phases of the network formation process, to a long-term operation where the network is carrying data reliably from sources to their destinations. The good nodes do not know who the bad nodes are, and are required to follow the published protocol suite. Throughout all phases, the bad nodes can perfectly collaborate and incessantly indulge in any disruptive behavior to make the network formation and operation dysfunctional. They could just "jam," or engage in more intricate behavior, such as not relaying a packet, advertising a wrong hop count, advertising a wrong logical topology, causing packet collisions, disrupting attempts at cooperative scheduling, dropping an ACK, refusing to acknowledge a neighbor's handshake, or behaving inconsistently.
We design a protocol suite that is provably secure against all such attacks by the malicious nodes. Not only that, it guarantees min-max optimal performance, described by a given utility function. The good nodes maximize it by publishing a complete protocol suite and conforming to it, while the bad nodes minimize it by indulging in all manners of "Byzantine" behavior described before and not conforming to the protocol.
This leads to a zero-sum game. Since the good nodes first announce the protocol, the best value of the utility function that the good nodes can hope to attain is its max-min, where the maximization is over all protocol suites, and the minimization is over all Byzantine behaviors of the bad nodes. We will prove that the protocol suite designed attains this max-min to within any > 0. Moreover, we establish three even stronger results.
First, this game actually has a saddle point, that is, the protocol suite attains the min-max (to within any > 0). (Generally, min-max results in a higher utility than max-min, since the bad nodes have to first disclose their tactics.) Second, the bad nodes can do no better than just jamming or conforming to the published protocol suite on each "concurrent transmission vector," a generalization of the notion of an "independent set" of nodes that can simultaneously transmit. They do not benefit from more elaborate Byzantine antics.
Third, If the bad nodes behave suboptimally, that is, they are not totally hostile, the protocol optimally exploits it. This is a desirable feature since one would want them to exploit any benignness in the environment.
Some important qualifications need to be noted. First, the results are valid only for the postulated model of the network. Future research may identify technological capabilities outside the model that can attack the protocol suite. Such discoveries will, one hopes, lead to the development of more general models and procotols provably secure in them. The research enterprise will thereby be elevated to a higher level; instead of reacting to each proposed protocol, one reacts to each proposed model, with provable guarantees provided at each step. Section VII provides some such directions for model generalization.
Second, the optimality is over a large time period, and the overhead of transient phases of the protocol may be high. However, there is much scope for optimizing protocol overhead while preserving security.
Third, how should one view the proposed protocol suite? The answer is layered. At a minimum, it can be regarded as a constructive existence proof that one can indeed provide optimal performance while guaranteeing security, with the identified model class only serving as an exemplar of conditions under which this can be done. To a more receptive reader, the designed protocol suite is suggestive of how one can do so. The architectural decomposition into several phases could perhaps be kept in mind by future protocol designers.
At any rate, we hope that this approach will trigger several critical reactions among a skeptical readership, and lead to follow up work that designs better protocols with guaranteed security and performance for better models.
II. MODEL
The model of an ad-hoc wireless network infiltrated by hostile nodes can be organized into four categories: 1) the nodal model (N); 2) communication model (CO); 3) clock behavior (CL); and 4) cryptographic capabilities (CR).
Nodal Model: (N1) There are n nodes, some good and some bad. Let G denote the set of good nodes, and its complement B the set of bad nodes. (N2) The good nodes do not know who the bad nodes are a priori. (N3) The bad nodes are able to fully coordinate their actions, and are fully aware of their collective states (equivalent to unlimited bandwidth with zero delay between them). (N4) The good nodes are all initially powered off, and they all turn on within U 0 time units of the first good node that turns on.
Communication Model: We consider an abstraction of a communication model that is fully deterministic. (CO1) Each node i can choose from among a finite set of transmission/ reception modes M i at each time. Each mode corresponds, if transmitting, to a joint choice of power level, modulation scheme, and encoding scheme for each other intended receiver node, or to just listening and not transmitting, or even to a distinguished mode called "jamming" (where models using its power output to emit noise). (CO2) The good nodes are halfduplex, that is, they cannot transmit and receive simultaneously. (CO3) We call c = (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n ) as denoting the mode choices of all the nodes made at a certain time, as a "concurrent transmission vector" (CTV). (It is more general than an independent set that is sometimes used to model wireless networks.) We will denote by c G = (c i : i ∈ G) and c B = (c i : i ∈ B) the vectors of choices of modes made by the good and bad nodes, respectively, with each c i ∈ M i , and let C G and C B denote the sets of all such choices. We will denote by C := C G × C B , the set of all CTVs. (CO4) Each c results in a "link-rate vector" r(c) of dimension n(n − 1). Its ijth component r ij (c) is the data rate at which bits sent by node i can be decoded at node j at that time. Due to the shared nature of the wireless medium, the rate depends on the transmission mode choices made by all other nodes as well as the geographic locations of the nodes, the propagation path loss, the ambient noise, and all other physical characteristics affecting data rate. A component r ij (c) may be zero, for example, if the SINR at j is below a threshold value for decoding, or if node i is not transmitting to node j. If a single node changes its mode to "jam," the resulting rate vector is coordinate wise no larger than what it is when that node chooses any other mode. (CO5) If a certain rate vector is achievable, then lower rates are also achievable. To state this, define A ij := {r ij (c) : c ∈ C} and let A := ∪ i =j A ij denote the finite set of all possible non-negative rates that can be achieved, with 0 ∈ A. 1 We suppose that for every c and r ≤ r(c) (understood component wise) with all elements in A, there is a choice c ∈ C such that r(c ) = r . (CO6) In the case of a bad node j, the rate r ij (c) may be the result of some other bad node being able to decode the packet from i at that rate, and then passing on that packet to j, since bad nodes can collaborate perfectly. In the case of a bad node i, the rate r ij (c) may be the result of some other bad node being able to transmit the packet successfully to j at that rate, pretending to be i. Meanwhile, in either case, the bad node may be jamming. Thus, a bad node can both jam and appear to be cooperating, whether transmitting or receiving, at the same time. (CO7) The bad nodes can claim to have received transmissions from each other at any of the rates in the finite set A, as they please. To state this, for c = (c G , c B ), we will partition the resulting link-rate vector as r(c) = (r GG (c), r GB (c), r BG (c), r BB (c)), where r BG denotes the link-rates from the bad nodes to the good nodes, etc. We suppose that for every c = (c G , c B ) and every r with all elements in A, there is a c B ∈ C B such that The assumption that the link-rate vector r(c) does not change with time implicitly assumes that nodes are not mobile to any significant extent.
Clock Model: (CL1) Each good node i has a local continuous-time clock that it initializes to zero when it turns on. Its time τ i (t) is affine with respect to some reference time t ≥ 0, that is, τ i (t) = a i t + b i , where a i and b i are called the skew and offset, respectively. Wlog, the time t above and in (N4) is taken to be equal to the clock time of the first good node to turn on. (CL2) Denoting the relative skew and offset between nodes i and j by a ij := a i /a j and b ij := b i − a ij b j , node i's time with respect to node j's time s is τ i j (s) = a ij s + b ij . We assume 0 < a ij ≤ a max . As a corollary of (N4, CL1, CL2),
The good nodes do not know their skew or offset a priori. (CL4) Finally, due to its digital processor, a good node i can only observe a quantized version of its continuous-time local clock τ i (t). 1 For example, A = {0, 6, 9, 12, 18, 24, 36, 48 Cryptographic Capabilities: (CR1) Each node is assigned a public key and a private key; information encrypted by a public key can only be decrypted with the corresponding private key. A message signed by a private key can be verified by any node with the public key. The private key is never revealed by a good node to any other node. Possession of a public key does not enable an attacker to forge, alter, or tamper with an encrypted packet generated with the corresponding private key. The good nodes encrypt all of their transmissions. (CR2) Each node possesses the public key of a central authority.
(CR3) Each node possesses an identity certificate, signed by the central authority, containing node i's public key and ID number. The certificate binds node i's public key to its identity. (CR4) Each node possesses a list of all other n node IDs. Now we describe a key "connectedness assumption" that makes cooperation among the good nodes feasible even in the face of hostile Byzantine attacks by the bad nodes. Consider a mode c = (c G , c B ). It attains a rate r(c G , c B ). Now suppose that the protocol at some point requires the implementation of (c G , c B ). Toward this end, the good nodes would faithfully choose their portion c G . Now suppose that there exists a choice c B such that for some link
That is, by their actions, the bad nodes can prevent the intended rate from being realized, at least for one link. Then, we say that the CTV c = (c G , c B ) can be disabled by the bad nodes. 2 Let D * denote the set of all such CTVs that can be disabled. Let G * be defined as the directed graph over the nodes, where there is an edge ij if and only if r ij (c) > 0 for some c ∈ D * . This is the graph over which communication cannot be disrupted by the bad nodes.
Connectedness Assumption (C): We will assume that the set consisting of all good nodes is connected in the subgraph of G * that consists only of edges ij for which ij and ji are edges in G * .
We now consider a utility function of the throughputs of any subset S of source-destination pairs. We define it for all subsets since we will consider the utility of those nodes that are perceived as conforming to the protocol.
Utility Function Assumption (U): For any subset S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} and any n(n − 1)-dimensional end-toend throughput vector x, let U (x, S) depend only on x ij for i, j ∈ S. For every S, U (x, S) is continuous and monotone increasing in the components of x.
In order to quantify how good performance is achievable, we need to specify what end-to-end rates are actually feasible through multihop. Suppose that D ⊂ D * denotes the particular set of CTVs that the bad nodes has chosen to disable. Let us call the complement E := C \ D as the "allowed set." Let ConvexHull({r(c) : c ∈ E}) be the set of link rate-vectors supported by E by time-sharing over the CTVs in E. Denote by P ij , the set of all multihop paths from i to j. We can now define the multihop capacity region of n(n − 1)-dimensional end-toend source-destination throughput vectors in the standard way as C(E) := {x : For some vector y ≥ 0 with 0 ≤ p: ∈p y p ≤ r for some r ∈ R(E), x ij = p∈P ij y p for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, j = i}.
We also define G(E) as the directed graph over the nodes, where there is an edge ij if and only if r ij (c) > 0 for some c ∈ E.
We now consider the game where the good nodes wish to maximize the utility for the nodes perceived to be good by them, while the bad nodes wish to minimize it over all their Byzantine behaviors. To obtain an upper bound on utility, suppose that the bad nodes disable only the CTVs in D and reveal this choice to the good nodes. If G(E) has several strongly connected components, then, by the connectedness assumption (C), the good nodes are all in the same component, denoted by F (E) and, thus, know that the nodes outside F (E) are bad. They will therefore only consider the utility accrued as U (x, F (E)), and maximize it over all x ∈ C(E). An upper bound on this achievable utility is therefore min
III. OUTLINE OF THE APPROACH
We will show in this paper that, despite perfect collusion and collaboration between all of the bad nodes in engaging in all manner of Byzantine behaviors, such as, but not limited to, not relaying a packet, advertising a wrong hop count, advertising a wrong logical topology, behaving uncooperatively vis-a-vis medium access, disrupting attempts at cooperative scheduling, dropping ACKs, refusing to acknowledge a neighbor's handshake, behaving inconsistently, and given that the good nodes have to build a complete network from scratch right from birth without knowing who their neighbors are, and without the good nodes knowing the identity of the bad nodes, the good nodes can achieve the above optimized utility arbitrarily closely. Moreover, the fact that it is the min-max and not just the max-min that is achievable, has several implications. Our proof is constructive, providing a complete protocol suite from birth to network formation and operation of a utility optimizing network.
Our scheme above relies heavily on the Byzantine agreement algorithm. This allows the nodes to agree on a common view, even in the presence of malicious nodes. Additionally, we go beyond mere Byzantine agreement and ensure that the common view is actually internally consistent. 3 Subsequently, after agreeing on a common view, which includes clocks, each node can act in a distributed fashion, with no need to exchange control messages, This enables our protocol to withstand any malicious attacks on control packets. Since the malicious nodes cannot attack control messages, they are left with only attacking data messages. That is, they can only jam if they want to. This explains why we are able to obtain the min-max optimality result.
Our agreement on a common view includes an extension of what one may call "logical topology," as well as clock information. The extension of logical topology is necessary because a wireless network cannot simply be described as a graph with rates on links, as wireline networks can. In a wireless network, whether a pair of nodes can communicate depends on what other nodes are concurrently transmitting and at what power, as well as whether the recipient node is itself "listening," since we allow the good modes to be only half-duplex. Thus what happens in a wireless network depends on the nature of all the concurrent transmissions. So our Byzantine agreement is about the rate vectors achieved by various possibilities for concurrent transmissions, that is, what we have called "CTVs" above.
Our Byzantine agreement is also about the clocks at different nodes. Once that is done nodes can cooperate simply by the times of their own clocks. 4 Hence they will not need further control messages to cooperate.
The heart of the approach after agreeing on a common view is to investigate different CTVs, exploiting the fact that the operation of the network consists of invoking which particular CTV to use at any given instant. If a good node fails to receive a scheduled packet, then that good node alerts the rest of the network during a verification phase, and the offending CTV set is never used again. After each such pruning the network then re-optimizes its utility over the remaining CTVs. 5 The decreasing sequence of residual remaining sets of CTVs necessarily converges to an operational collection of CTVs, over which the utility is optimized by time sharing. Since the set of disabled CTVs is determinable by the network, as we show, it is the same as if it were revealed to the good nodes a priori, which allows achievement of min-max. It also shows that more complex Byzantine behaviors than jamming or cooperating are not any more effective for the bad nodes.
There are, however, several problems that lie along the way to realizing this scheme. How does one determine the network topology and other parameters, while under attack from bad nodes? During this period even control packets can be attacked. We present a complete protocol suite that proceeds through several phases to achieve this end result. After their birth, the nodes need to first discover who their neighbors are. This requires a two-way handshake, which presents one problem already. Two good nodes that are neighbors can successfully send packets to each other if there are no primary (half-duplex) or secondary (collision) conflicts. To achieve this we employ an orthogonal MAC Code [20] . 6 Next, the two nodes need to update their clock parameters. After this, the nodes propagate their neighborhood information so that everyone learns about the network topology. This also poses some challenges when there are intermediary bad nodes. This is addressed by a version of the Byzantine General's algorithm of [1] . This paper proved both agreement and validity for graphs in which the number of faulty nodes f is no more than a third of the total, that is, n > 3f + 1, and the connectivity of the graph G satisfies conn(G) > 2f . However, it is also well established that agreement and validity hold in complete graphs for n > f if the network employs perfect authentication [17] . This result can also be extended to graphs such as ours, in which the legitimate nodes are connected. Next, even though all the good nodes converge to a common network view, that view may be internally inconsistent, especially with respect to clocks. To resolve this we employ a certain consistency check algorithm. Next, the nodes proceed to determine an optimal schedule for time sharing over the set of CTVs that have performed consistently from the very beginning, and execute it. However, a bad node that has cooperated hitherto may not cooperate at this point. Hence the results of this operational phase need to be verified, the dysfunctional CTV pruned, the schedule reoptimized, and the procedure iterated.
The reader may wonder: Why do we even need a notion of "time"? First, without it, we cannot even speak of throughput or thus of utility. Second, we use local clocks to schedule transmissions and coordinate activity (as is quite common, for example, time-outs in MAC and transport protocols). On the other hand, dependence on distributed synchronized clocks for coordinated activity opens yet another avenue for bad nodes to sabotage the protocol-interfering with the clock synchronization algorithm. Therefore, topics like scheduling, clock synchronization, utility maximization, are deeply interwoven. Therefore, one needs a holistic approach that addresses all these issues at every stage of the operating lifetime, and further guarantees min-max optimality.
One obvious drawback of our approach is the complexity of Byzantine agreement. Concerning this, there are several points to be kept in mind. First, technically speaking, we amortize this overhead by running a very long data transmission and, thus, the utility accruing phase. That is why we are able to prove -minmax optimality. Nevertheless, the transients are unrealistically long if one implements our algorithm exactly the way specified. However, one can optimize on this, and we hope that follow up papers will do so, for example by postponing verification until all data are exchanged, since it may well be the case that there are no malicious nodes. Thus one may be able to design lower complexity algorithms where complex algorithms are only invoked if necessary, but otherwise nodes proceed optimistically. All of the above is in line with our dictum that one can optimize algorithms under ultimate security guarantees. Finally, it must be kept in mind that this paper is only intended to be an initial foray to show that provable security is achieved under appropriate models and how to do so, and that we are hoping that others will propose alternative models that are both more realistic as well as more tractable. Some important further desirable directions for extension are outlined in Section VII. This is the raison d'être for this paper.
IV. PHASES OF THE PROTOCOL SUITE
The protocol suite we show to be optimal consists of six phases: 1) Neighbor Discovery; 2) Network Discovery; 3) Consistency Check; 4) Scheduling; 5) Data Transfer; and 6) Verification.
We first note the necessity for a key ingredient, guaranteed medium access control. Even two good nodes that are neighbors as in assumption (C) are only guaranteed to be able to successfully send packets to each other provided one is transmitting, the other is listening (since good nodes are half-duplex), and the remaining good nodes are all silent. The orthogonal MAC code (OMC) of [20] ensures the simultaneity of all these events, even though the clocks of different nodes have different skews and offsets. For each pair of nodes i, j, it defines certain zeroone valued functions of local time at each node, such that if i transmits a packet of duration W to j at that time, then the packet is successfully received, and the delay involved in waiting for such an eventuality is never more than a certain T MAC (W ).
A. Neighbor Discovery Phase
In this phase, each node i will determine the identity and relative clock parameters of nodes in its neighborhood N i , and include these data in a mutually authenticated link certificate.
In the first two steps, each node i attempts a handshake with a neighbor node j by broadcasting a probe packet PRB ij and waiting for an acknowledgement ACK ji . The probe packet contains an identity certificate signed by a central authority. Given N i := {1, . . . , n} \ i, an initial candidate for the set of bidirectional neighbors of i (as in (C)), to indicate that node i transmits PRB ij to each node j ∈ N i via the OMC, and receives PRB jj from each node j ∈ N i , we use TxRxMAC(PRB i→N i , PRB N i →i ). If a probe packet is not received from some node j, then j is pruned from N i .
Next, node i transmits an acknowledgment ACK ij to node j containing a signed confirmation of the received probe packet PRB j . Node i also listens for an acknowledgment ACK ji from node j. Node i further removes from N i any nodes that failed to return acknowledgements.
Then node i transmits to each node j ∈ N i a pair of timing packets TIM (1) i,j and TIM (2) i,j that contain the send-times s (1) ij and s (2) ij , respectively, as recorded by its local clock τ i (t). Node i also receives a corresponding pair of timing packets TIM (1) j,i and TIM (2) j,i from node j, and records the corresponding receive times r (1) ji and r (2) ji , respectively, as measured by the local clock τ i (t). Any node that fails to deliver timing packets to node i is further removed from N i . The timing packets are used to estimate the relative skew a ji byâ ji := (r
The relative skew is used at the end of the Network Discovery Phase, to estimate a reference clock with respect to the local continuous-time clock. In the last two steps, node i creates a link certificate LNK (1) ij containing the computed relative clock skew with respect to node j, and transmits this link to node j using the OMC. Node i also listens for a similar link certificate LNK (1) ji from node j. Finally, node i verifies and signs the received link certificate, and transmits the authenticated version LNK (2) ji back to node j. Node i listens for a similar authenticated link certificate LNK (2) ij from j. Any nodes that fail to return link certificates are removed from the set N i . This set now represents the nodes in the neighborhood of node i with whom node i has established mutually authenticated link certificates. The Neighbor Discovery Phase's pseudocode is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 The Neighbor Discovery Phase
One problem is that the algorithm must be completed in a partially coordinated manner even though the nodes are asynchronous; the completion of any stage in the Exponential Information Gathering (EIG) algorithm (see below) depends on the successful completion of the previous stages by all other good nodes. Consequently, we assign increasingly larger intervals S k := [t k , t k+1 ), k = 1, . . . 6, to each successive protocol stage; see Section VI.
B. Network Discovery Phase
The purpose of this phase is to allow the good nodes to obtain a common view of the network topology and consistent estimates of all clock parameters. To accomplish this, the good nodes must disseminate their lists of neighbors to all nodes, so that all can decide on the same topology view. However, good nodes do not know a priori which nodes are bad, and so bad nodes can selectively drop lists or introduce false lists to prevent consensus. We resolve this by using a version of the Byzantine General's algorithm of [1] , requiring an EIG tree data structure. Let T i denote node i's EIG tree, which by construction has depth n. The root of T i is labelled with node i's neighborhood, that is, the nodes in N i and the corresponding collection of link certificates. First node i transmits to every node j ∈ N j in its neighborhood, the list of nodes in N i and corresponding link certificates, while receiving similar lists from each node in N j . Node i updates its EIG tree with the newly received lists from its neighbors, by assigning each received list to a unique child vertex of the root of T i . Node i then transmits the set of level 1 vertices of T i to every node in its neighborhood, receiving a set of level 1 vertcies from each neighbor in turn. The EIG tree T i is updated again. This process continues through all n levels of the EIG tree.
The notation T (k) i in Algorithm 2 indicates the k-level vertices of the EIG tree T i . The notation TxRxMAC(T 
We use UPDATE(T i ), to update the EIG tree T i after the arrival of new information, and the procedure DECIDE(T i ) to infer the network topology based on the EIG tree. The n-stage EIG algorithm guarantees that if the subgraph of good nodes is connected, then each good node will decide on the same topological view.
C. Consistency Check Phase
Unfortunately, a fundamental difficulty is that malicious nodes along a path 1, . . . , n may have generated false time stamps in the Neighbor Discovery Phase, and thus corrupted the measured relative skews between adjacent nodes. There may be several connecting paths infiltrated by bad nodes that thereby generate different values for the relative skew. It is impossible to determine the correct path from the relative skews alone. Every pair of such inconsistent paths corresponds to an inconsistent cycle in which the skew product is not equal to one. We use an algorithm called Consistency Check to identify the path that generated the correct relative skew.
Consistency Check works by circling a timing packet around every cycle in which the skew product differs from one by more than a desired maximum skew error a . At its conclusion, the test removes at least one link with a malicious endpoint from the cycle, eliminating a connecting path. During the test, each node in such a cycle is obliged to append a receive time-stamp and a send time-stamp generated by the local clock before forwarding the packet to the next node. These time-stamps must satisfy a delay bound condition; the send and receive times cannot differ by more than 1 clock count. A node fails the consistency check otherwise, or if its time stamps do not agree with its declared relative skew. The key idea is that if the test starts after a sufficiently large amount of time has elapsed, the clock estimates based on faulty relative skews will have diverged so extensively from the actual clocks that at least one malicious node in the cycle will find it impossible to generate time-stamps that are consistent with its declared relative clock skew and satisfy the delay bound condition (all proofs are in Section VI).
Theorem IV.1: Let T j be the start-time of the Consistency Check for the jth inconsistent cycle, consisting of nodes i 1 , . . . , i m . At least one malicious node in cycle j will violate a consistency check condition, if T j > (â i m ,i * (m+1)K + b )/ a where i * is the node with the smallest skew productâ i * ,i 1 .
Algorithm 3 depicts Consistency Check. Given a cycle j, the indices k and m denote nodes that follow and precede node i, respectively, in the cycle. If node i is the leader of the cycle, that is, the node with smallest ID, then node i initiates the timing packet that traverses the cycle and transmits it to node k. Otherwise, node i waits for the timing packet to arrive from node m before forwarding it to node k.
Algorithm 3 Consistency Check Algorithm at Node
After all inconsistent cycles have been tested, each node i disseminates the set of all timing packets T i it received to other nodes. The EIG algorithm is used to ensure a common view of the timing packets generated. Each node removes from the topology any link whose endpoints generate time-stamps inconsistent with its declared relative skew or violated the delay bound. The complete phase is shown in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 The Network Discovery Phase at Node
At the conclusion of the Network Discovery Phase, node i shares a common view of the network topology with all other good nodes. As a result, the network can designate the node with smallest ID as the reference clock. Furthermore, each node i has an estimate of the reference clock τ r i (t) with respect to its local clock t using the formulaτ r i (t) :=â ri t, where estimated a ri and actual relative skews a ri differ by, at most, a .
D. Scheduling Phase
In the Scheduling Phase, the good nodes in the network obtain a common schedule governing the transmission and reception of data packets. A "schedule" is simply a sequence of CTVs, each with specified start and end times. Each node i divides the Data Transfer Phase into time-slots, and assigns a CTV to each time-slot so that the resulting throughput vector is utility optimal. All the good nodes independently arrive at the same schedule since they independently optimize the same utility function over the same C (ties broken lexicographically).
Since the good nodes must conform to a common schedule, each node i generates a local estimate of the reference clock τ r i (t) with respect to its local clock t, as described in the Network Discovery Phase. However, this estimate may not be perfectly accurate; some of the nodes on a path along which relative skew is estimated may be malicious and can introduce an error of, at most, a into the computed relative skew. To address this, the time-slots are separated by a deadtime of size D, where given any pair of nodes (i, j), D is chosen to satisfy |τ r i (t) −τ r j (τ j i (t))| ≤ D. Finally, n 2 (n − 1) time-slots are enough to guarantee that every pair of nodes can communicate once in either direction, via multihop routing, during Data Transfer Phase. The algorithm UtilityMaximization(C) for the Scheduling Phase is depicted in Algorithm 5. At the end of Scheduling Phase, node i shares a common utility maximizing schedule with other good nodes.
Algorithm 5
The Scheduling Phase at Node i procedure SCHEDULING UTILITYMAXIMIZATION(C) end procedure
E. Data Transfer Phase
In this phase the nodes exchange data packets using the generated schedule. It is divided into time-slots, with each assigned a CTV, a rate vector, and set of packets for each transmitter in the set. To prevent collisions resulting from two nodes assigning themselves to different time slots due to timing error, node i begins transmission D time-units after the start of the time-slot. The transmitted packet is then guaranteed to arrive at the receiver in the same time slot, for appropriate choice of D and time-slot size B slot . Algorithm 7 defines this phase, with m k denoting a message to be transmitted or received by node i in the kth slot, T start the start time of the phase measured by the local estimate of the reference clockτ r i (t)), S k = [t k , t k+1 ), k = 1, . . . , N the time-slots of the phase with N = n 2 (n − 1), t 1 = T start , and t k+1 := t k + B slot + 2D, and TX(k) and RX(k) the CTV, and receiving nodes during slot k. 
F. Verification Phase
However, malicious nodes may not cooperate in the Data Transfer Phase. So whenever a scheduled packet fails to arrive at node j, it adds the offending CTV and associated packet number to a list, and disseminates the list in the Verification Phase using the EIG Byzantine General's algorithm. These CTVs are then permanently further pruned from the collection of feasible CTVs. With L k denoting the list that failed during the kth iteration of the Data Transfer Phase, the set C k of feasible CTVs during the kth iteration of the Scheduling Phase is updated to C k+1 = C k \ L k in Algorithm 7.
All communication can be scheduled into slots separated by a deadtime of 2D. Within each of the n stages of the EIG Byzantine General's algorithm, there are n(n − 1) pairs of nodes that may communicate and, at most, n nodes on the connecting path. Therefore, the total number of time slots required is n 3 (n − 1) .
At the conclusion of the phase, the good nodes again share a common view of the set of feasible CTVs for the next iteration of the Scheduling Phase.
Algorithm 7 The Verification Phase at Node
i procedure VERIFICATION EIGBYZ(L k ) UPDATE(C k+1 ) end procedure
G. Steady State
The network cycles through Scheduling, Data Transfer, and Verification Phases for n iter iterations. Eventually, by finiteness, it converges to a set of CTVs, and a utility-maximizing schedule over it. The overall protocol is in Algorithm 8.
Algorithm 8 The Complete Protocol
Our main result, elaborated on in Theorem VI.2, is: Theorem V.1: Consider a network that satisfies (N), (CO), (CL), (CR), (C), and (U). Given an arbitrary , where 0 < < 1, the protocol described above ensures that all of the good nodes obtain a common estimate of the connected component that they are all members of, and achieves the utility (1 − ) min
where α k is the fraction of the operating lifetime in which the concurrent transmission vectors in D k are disabled, satisfies k α k = 1.
Some important consequences are the following. Normally, one would expect that since the good nodes have to first declare their protocol and follow it, they can only attain "max-min," which is generally smaller than min-max. Since the latter can be attained (arbitrarily closely), it shows firstly that the bad nodes are unable to benefit from having a priori knowledge of the protocol. Second, since all that the bad nodes can benefit from is deciding which sets to disable, they are effectively limited to jamming and/or cooperating in each CTV. Other more Byzantine behaviors are not any more effective.
The example below shows why a bad node may prefer to "conform" rather than jam for some utility functions.
Example V.1: Consider the network of Fig. 1 . Nodes 1 and 2 are good and in close proximity, while node 3 is bad and located far away. Consider the "fairness-based "utility function U (x) := min{x 12 , x 32 }. If node 3 jams, then the connected component becomes {1, 2}, and the good nodes proceed to maximize only x 12 , which node 3 can only slightly impinge because it is so far away from node 2. However, if node 3 cooperates, then the connected component is {1, 2, 3}, and the optimal solution for this "fair" utility function is to make x 32 = x 12 . However, link 32 being weak, it requires much more airtime than link 12, thus considerably reducing x 12 .
There are two important directions for future research that arise from just a perusal of this example. First, it shows that the choice of the utility function adopted in designing the protocol is important. As we have seen above the choice of the utility function U (x) := min{x 12 , x 32 } can be exploited by the bad nodes using a partial deafness attack (i.e., pretending to be very far away and thus receiving only a weak signal) to hurt the performance obtained by the good nodes. However, the utility function U (x) := x 12 + x 32 is less exploitable by such a partial deafness attack. This points to the importance of properly choosing the utility function in the design of the protocol.
Second, as we have noted at the very outset of the paper, the results obtained are specifically with respect to the model of the capabilities available to the good and bad nodes. If nodes have availability to geographical positions of other nodes then claiming partial deafness due to being far away can be secured against. The points to the importance of investigating more general model classes that technology (e.g., GPS) can potentially support. Also, if malicious nodes have other means of attack, then that also would point to the need for generalizing the model.
The larger and important point is that we would have thereby elevated the theory of security from responding to attack by attack, to a theory that addresses models and utility functions. This is a much higher level playing field.
VI. FEASIBILITY OF PROTOCOL AND OPTIMALITY PROOF
For the distributed wireless nodes to exchange data over the network, they must have a consistent view of a reference clock so that any activity will conform to this common schedule. For this, we consider the consistency check algorithm of Section IV-C. Consider a chain network 1, . . . , n, where the endpoints, nodes 1 and n are good, and the intermediate nodes 2, . . . , n − 1 are bad. Note that this network can also be reduced to a cycle of size n − 1 by making both endpoints the same node. We assume that the two good endpoints do not know if any of the intermediate nodes are bad. Now suppose that each pair of adjacent nodes (i, i − 1) for i = 2, . . . , n has declared a set of relative skews and offsets {â i,i−1 ,b i,i−1 }, and that each node in the chain knows this set. The two good nodes wish to determine whether the declared skews are accurate, that is, whether a n,1 = n i=2â i,i−1 . As per the consistency check, node 1 initiates a timing packet that traverses the chain from left to right after waiting a sufficiently long period of time. Each node in the chain is obligated to forward the packet after appending receive and time-stamps that satisfy the skew consistency and delay bound conditions.
In order to defeat this test, the bad nodes, having collectively declared a false set of relative skews and offsets, must support two sets of clocks for each node i ∈ {2, . . . , n}: a "left" clock τ i,l (t) to generate receive time-stamps, and a "right" clock τ i,r (t) to generate send-time stamps. The bad nodes are free to jointly select any set of clocks {τ i,l (t), τ i,r (t), ∀i = 2, . . . , n − 1} that are arbitrary functions of t, a much larger set than the affine clocks being emulated. However, we will show that if node 1 waits sufficiently long enough, there is no set of clocks {τ i,l (t), τ i,r (t), i = 2, . . . , n − 1} that can generate time-stamps which satisfy both conditions of the consistency check.
Let r i,i−1 and s i,i+1 denote the receive and send time-stamps generated by a bad node i with respect to the left and right clocks τ i,l (t) and τ i,r (t), respectively. Let t i,l and t i,r denote the time with respect to the global reference clock at which the receive and send time-stamps are generated at node i. We have r i−1,i := τ i,l (t i,l ) and s i,i+1 := τ i,r (t i,r ). Let t 1 and t n denote the time with respect to the global reference clock at which the timing packet was transmitted by node 1 and received by node n, respectively. We have s 1,2 := τ 1 (t 1 ), r n−1,n := τ n (t n ). To simplify notation we will define left and right clocks at the endpoints so that t 1,r := t 1 , t n,l := t n and τ 1,r (t 1,r ) := τ 1 (t 1 ), τ n,l (t n,l ) := τ n (t n ).
In order to prove that both conditions of the consistency check cannot be satisifed by any set of clocks {τ i,l (t), τ i,r (t), i = 2, . . . , n − 1}, we will assume that the first condition is satisfied, and show that second must fail. Therefore, the clocks must satisfy
In addition, by virtue of causality, we also have
We prove that delay bound condition must be violated if node 1 waits for a sufficiently large period of time before before initiating the timing packet, that is, if τ 1 (t 1 ) is sufficiently large, then for some i, we have τ i,r (t i,r ) − τ i,l (t i,l ) > K. More precisely, we show n−1 i=2 (τ i,r (t i,r ) − τ i,l (t i,l )) > nK, which implies that some node has violated delay bound condition. We have the following equality τ n,l (t n,l ) = τ 1,r (t 1,r ) + 1,r ) ). The value S 2 is the sum of the forwarding delays. We will use (1) and (2) to obtain an upper bound on S 1 . Inserting this upper bound and using the fact that τ n,l (t) and τ 1,r (t) are both affine functions of t, will allow us to obtain a lower bound on S 2 . The proof will then follow easily. We now obtain an upper bound on S 1 when the forward skew product j i=2â i,i−1 ≥ 1 for all j ≥ 2.
We have, by definition, τ n+1,l (t n,l ) :=â n+1,n τ n,r (t n,r ) +b n+1,n . For n = 2, we have τ 2,l (t 2,l ) − τ 1,r (t 1,r ) = ((a 2,1 − 1)/a 2,1 )τ 2,l (t 2,l )+(b 2,1 /a 2,1 ). Now assume the lemma is true for n. We will show that it also holds for
, which follow from the induction hypothesis above in the lemma statement, and the fact that τ n,r (t n,r ) ≥ τ n,l (t n,l ) and a i,1 ≥ 1 for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n + 1 (that is, the coefficientâ i,1 − 1 is negative).
We next bound S 1 in the special case when the reverse skew product j i=1â n−(i−1),n−i ≤ 1 for all j ≥ 1. Lemma VI.2: Suppose j i=1 a n−(i−1),n−i ≤ 1 for 2 ≤ j ≤ n − 1. Then, j i=1 (τ n−(i−1),l (t n−(i−1),l ) − τ n−i,r (t n−i,r ))≤ (â n,n−j − 1)τ n−j,r (t n−j,r )+b n,n−1 + n−1 i=n−j+1â n,ibi,i−1 . Proof: We have, by definition, τ n−(k−1),l (t n−(k−1),l ) := a n−(k−1),n−k τ n−k,r (t n−k,r )+b n−(k−1),n−k . For j = 1, τ n,l (t n,l ) − τ n−1,r (t n−1,r ) = (a n,n−1 − 1)τ n−1,r (t n−1,r ). Now assume the lemma holds for j. We will show that it must hold for j +1: j+1 k=1 (τ n−(k−1),l (t n−(k−1),l )−τ n−k,r (t n−k,r )) = j k=1 (τ n−(k−1),l (t n−(k−1),l ) − τ n−k,r (t n−k,r )) + τ n−j,l (t n−j,l )−τ n−(j+1),r (t n−(j+1),r )≤ (â n,n−j −1)τ n−j,r (t n−j,r )+ b n,n−1 + n−1 k=n−j+1â n,kbk,k−1 + τ n−j,l (t n−j,l ) − τ n−(j+1),r (t n−(j+1),r ) ≤ (â n,n−j −1)τ n−j,l (t n−j,l )+b n,n−1 + n−1 k=n−j+1 a n,kbk,k−1 + τ n−j,l (t n−j,l ) − τ n−(j+1),r (t n−(j+1),r ) ≤ (â n,n−(j+1) − 1)τ n−(j+1),r (t n−(j+1),r ) +b n,n−1 + n−1 k=n−ĵ a n,kbk,k−1 . The above follows from induction hypothesis in Lemma VI.2, since τ i,l (t i,l ) ≤ τ i,r (t i,r ) andâ n,n−j ≤ 1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1 (that is, the coefficientâ n,n−j − 1 is negative), and from substitution into τ n−j,l (t n−j,l ) and simplification.
We will combine both special cases in Lemma VI.1 and Lemma VI.2 to obtain an upper bound on S 1 . First, we define i * as the node with the smallest skew productâ i * ,1 in the chain network, that is less than one, that is,â i * ,1 = min kâ k,1 and a i * ,1 ≤ 1. If no such node exists, set i * = 1. Now we consider an arbitrary set of skews {â i,i−1 , i = 2, . . . , n}. Next, we show that if i * ≥ 2, then the forward skew product starting from i * is greater than 1, and the reverse skew product starting from i * − 1 is always less than one.
Proof: Consider i * ≥ 2, and suppose the first part of the assertion is false, that is, for some j ,â j i * < 1. It follows that a j 1 =â j i * â i * 1 ≤â i * 1 . But then j is a node with a smaller skew productâ j1 than node i * , which contradicts the definition of i * . Now suppose that the second part of the assertion is false. That is, for some j , we haveâ i * j > 1. It follows that:â i * 1 = a i * j â j 1 ≥â j 1 . But then, j is a node with a smaller skew product than node i * , which again contradicts the definition of i * . Now consider the case when i * = 1. Then, by definition of i * , it follows thatâ j1 ≥ 1 for all 2 ≤ j ≤ n.
We now obtain an upper bound on S 1 for arbitrary skews. Lemma VI.4: Suppose i * ≥ 2. We have the following inequality:
Which follow by applying Lemma VI.2 and Lemma VI.1, by multiplying the terms in each summation byâ n,i * /â n,i * and simplifying, and from the definitions ofb ij andd (i) ji . Now that we have an upper bound on S 1 , we can obtain a lower bound on S 2 , the sum of the forwarding delays.
Lemma VI.5: The sum of forwarding delays in the chain network satisfies n−1 j=2 (τ j,l (t j,l ) − τ j,r (t j,r )) ≥ ((a n,1 −â n,1 )/ a n,i * )τ 1,r (t 1,r ) + ((b n,1 −b n,1 )/â n,i * ).
Proof:
n−1 j=2 (τ j,l (t j,l ) − τ j,r (t j,r )) = τ n,l (t n,l ) − τ n,r (t n,r )− n j=2 τ j,l (t j,l ) − τ j−1,r (t j−1,r ) ≥ τ n,l (t n,l ) − τ n,r (t n,r )−(â i * ,1 − 1)τ 1,r (t 1,r ) − ((â n,i * − 1)/â n,i * )τ n,l (t n,l )− (b n,1 /â n,i * ) ≥ (τ n,l (t 1,r ) /â n,i * ) −â i * ,1 τ 1,r (t 1,r )−(b n,1 / a n,i * ) = ((a n,1 −â n,1 )/â n,i * )τ 1,r (t 1,r )+((b n,1 −b n,1 )/â n,i * ), which follow by applying Lemma VI.4, because t n,l ≥ t 1,r since node n could not have received the timing packet before node 1 transmitted it, and since node n's clock is relatively affine with respect to 1's.
To complete the proof, we show that if the start time of the consistency check is sufficiently large, and the left and right clocks {τ i,l (t i,l ), τ i,r (t i,r )} satisfy the parameter consistency condition, then at least one node will violate the delay bound condition.
Proof: We assume node 1 is a good node. Now ((a n,1 −â n,1 )/â n,i * )τ 1,r (t 1,r ) + ((b n,1 −b n,1 )/â n,i * )> nK. But by Lemma VI.5, the left-hand side (LHS) of this inequality is the lower bound of the sum of the delays in the chain n j=2 (τ j,l (t j,l ) − τ j,r (t j,r )). By substitution, n j=2 (τ j,l (t j,l ) − τ j,r (t j,r )) > nK. It follows that for some malicious node j ∈ {2, . . . , n}, τ j,l (t j,l ) − τ j,r (t j,r ) > K, which violates the delay bound condition. Now we can show that neighbor and network discovery phases together allow the good nodes to form a rudimentary network, where the good nodes have the same topological view and consistent estimates of a reference clock. The first obstacle is that the protocol is composed of stages that must be completed sequentially by all nodes in the network, even prior to clock synchronization. Suppose that [t k , t k+1 ) is the interval allocated to the kth stage. Any messages transmitted between adjacent good nodes must arrive in the same interval they were transmitted. Since send-times are measured with respect to the source clock, and receive-times with respect to the destination clock, the intervals must be chosen large enough to compensate for the maximum clock divergence caused by skew a ij ≤ a max and offset b ij ≤ a max U 0 .
Lemma VI.6: There exists a sequence of adjacent time intervals [t k , t k+1 ) and corresponding schedule that guarantees any message of size W transmitted (via OMC) by node i in the interval [t k , t k+1 ) (as measured by i's clock) will be received by node j in the same interval as measured by node j's clock.
Proof: Set t k+1 := (a max ) 2 t k + 2(a max ) 3 U 0 + (a max ) 3 T MAC (W ). Suppose a message from node i to node j during [t k , t k+1 ) is transmitted (via the OMC) at t s := a max t k + (a max ) 2 U 0 with respect to node i's clock. By substitution and simplification, it follows that τ j
, and so j receives this message during the same interval with respect to j's clock.
Theorem VI.1: After Network Discovery, the good nodes have a common view of the topology and consistent estimates (to within a ) of the skew of the reference clock.
Proof: From Lemma VI.6, all good nodes will proceed through each stage of Neighbor and Network Discovery Phases together and, therefore, establish link certificates with their good neighbors. Since they form a connected component, the good nodes obtain a common view of their link certificates using the EIGByzMAC algorithm and the schedule in Lemma VI.6. The good nodes can therefore infer the network topology and the relative skews of all adjacent nodes based upon the collection of link certificates. Using Consistency Check, the good nodes can eliminate paths along which bad nodes have provided false skew data. The good nodes can disseminate this information to each other using the EIGByzMAC algorithm and Lemma VI.6 and thus obtain consistent estimates of the reference clock to within a .
Lemma VI.7: The sequence of adjacent intervals [t j , t j+1 ), j = 0, . . . , k is contained in [t 0 , c 1 t 0 + c 2 W ) where constants c 1 and c 2 depend on a max , k, U 0 , and n.
Proof: For the OMC T MAC (W ) ≤ cW , where c depends on a max , and n. The result for k = 1 follows from definition of t k , and substitution of cW into T MAC (W ), and for general k by induction and definition of t k .
Lemma VI.8: The time to complete Neighbor and Network Discovery Phases T nei + T net is less than c 1 log T life + (c 2 / a ) where c 1 , c 2 depend only on n, a max , U 0 .
Proof: From Algorithms 1-4 there are, at most, 6 + n + n|C| + n protocol stages in the Neighbor and Network Discovery Phases. Hence, the time required is, at most, c 1 t 0 + c 2 W , where W is the size of a message to be transmitted, and c 1 , c 2 are constants depending on the number of protocol stages a max , U 0 , n. The maximum size of a message is proportional to the timing packet size log T life . To account for the effect of the minimum start-time T s for the consistency check, we can assume the worst case that the T s comes into effect during the first protocol stage (instead of later in the Network Discovery Phase). From Theorem IV.1, the consistency check start-time is, at most, c/ a , where c depends on U 0 , a max , n. Substitution into t 0 proves the lemma.
Lemma VI.9: The time required for the Data Transfer Phase is, at most, c 3 B + c 4 D, where B is the time spent transmitting data packets, D is the size of the deadtime separating time slots, and c 3 , c 4 depend on n alone.
Proof: The total number of time slots for data transfer between all source destination pairs is n 2 (n − 1), each supporting a data transfer of size B s and a deadtime D.
Lemma VI.10: The time required for the Verification Phase is, at most, c 5 D where c 5 depends on n alone.
Proof: In each stage of the EIG Byzantine General's algorithm, there are, at most, n! vertex values that must be transmitted with each node in the neighborhood. The value of a vertex is a list of CTVs. There are, at most, 2 n CTVs and, at most, n nodes in a CTV. Therefore, the size of any message to be transmitted by a node during EIG algorithm is, at most, cD, where c is a constant dependent on n. Since there are n(n − 1) possible source-destination pairs, there are, at most, n(n − 1) time slots in each stage, separated at the beginning and end by a deadtime D. Therefore, the duration of each stage is, at most, cD + n(n − 1)2D. There are, at most, n stages.
Theorem VI.2: The protocol ensures that the network proceeds from startup to a functioning network carrying data. There exists a selection of parameters n iter , D, B, a and T life that achieves min-max utility over the allowed set, to within a factor , where the min is over all policies of the bad nodes that can only adopt two actions in each CTV: conform to the protocol and/or jam. The achieved utility is -optimal.
Proof: We begin by choosing parameters so that the protocol overhead, which includes Neighbor Discovery, Network Discovery, Verification, all deadtimes, and iterations converging to the final rate vector, is an arbitrarily small fraction of the total operating lifetime. Withτ r i (t) :=â ri t, the estimate of reference clock r with respect to the local clock at node i, the maximum difference in nodal estimates is bounded as |τ r i (τ i (t)) − τ r k (τ k i (τ i (t)))| ≤ 2(a max ) 2 a T life +(a max ) 2 U 0 . With k r being the number of rate vectors in the rate region, we can choose n iter , D, B, a and T life to satisfy n iter /(n iter + 2 n k r ) ≥ 1 − l , B/(c 1 log T life + (c 2 / a ) + B + c 3 D + c 4 D) ≥ 1 − d , n iter ((c 1 log T life + (c 2 / a ) + B + c 3 D + c 4 D) ≤ T life , 2(a max ) 2 a T life + (a max ) 2 U 0 ≤ D. These ensure that the rate loss due to failed CTVs is arbitrarily small, the time spent transmitting data is an arbitrarily large fraction of the duration of that iteration, the operating lifetime is large enough to support n iter protocol iterations, and the deadtime D is large enough to tolerate the maximum divergence in clock estimates caused by skew error a .
Consider a protocol iteration where the estimate of the set of feasible nondisabled concurrent transmission vectors is correct and equal to D k for some k. Suppose x achieves the maximum utility for D k over the nodes in the same component as the good nodes. No protocol can do better when D k is disabled. The proposed protocol attains x(1 − d ) during this iteration. By design, the fraction of the iterations in which this estimate is correct is (1 − l ). The theorem follows by noting that the fraction of the operating lifetime where D k is disabled is α k .
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have presented a complete suite of protocols that enables a collection of good nodes interspersed with bad nodes to form a functioning network from startup, operating at a utility-optimal rate vector, regardless of what the bad nodes conspire to do, under a certain system model. Further, the attackers cannot decrease the utility any more than they could by just conforming to the protocol or jamming on each CTV. This paper is only an initial attempt to develop a theoretical foundation for a much needed holistic all-layer approach to secure wireless networking, and there are several open issues, some more addressable than others. This paper essentially assumes the network to be time-varying; in particular, that it is not mobile. An extension to quasistatic mobility appears feasible, and is worth noting. Since the protocol presented has poor transient behavior, though overall asymptotically optimal, it is worthwhile to explore how to increase efficiency in the transient phase. One possibility is to use mere flooding algorithms and not invoke the Byzantine agreement unless it turns out that there are indeed malicious nodes which, in fact, can be checked in a post-facto verification phase. An important potential generalization is to allow probabilistic communication. Showing similar results in a "with high probability" sense appears feasible. Finally, the gap between information theory and security appears formidable, since the former does not recognize complexity-based cryptography.
More further work needs to be done.
